
Post Incident Analysis



Significant Injury Event

MCFRS Members Struck By Vehicle

February 15, 2015

Incident # 15-0018872

Submitted by Battalion Chief Kent Mallalieu

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Summary:

Just after midnight on the morning of February 15, 2015, four Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Service (MCFRS) volunteer members from Ambulance 711 were evaluating three patients in a car on the right shoulder of the inner loop of I-495. The vehicle had been involved in a minor collision. As the crew worked, an out of control pickup truck slid into the scene striking the car from the original collision and two of the four Glen Echo Fire Department members. The impact threw the two volunteers a significant distance, and was sufficient to push the original vehicle down the shoulder into the rear of Ambulance 711¹, injuring and trapping the three people inside the original auto. The uninjured members of Ambulance 711's crew called for assistance and numerous resources were sent to help.

The two MCFRS members who were struck received traumatic injuries requiring hospitalization, and, in one case, extensive rehabilitation. Both members will require follow up care. The incident also had a psychological impact on many of the MCFRS members who responded to assist.

The intent of this report is to examine what happened, and to identify things that could prevent or reduce the likelihood of a similar incident occurring in the future.

General Background:

The county's interstate highways, and other major traffic arteries, carry some of the heaviest traffic in the nation. Traffic density, distracted drivers, and aggressive driving all combine to produce a high volume of collisions on these roadways. MCFRS has found operating on these roads to be hazardous, and several pieces of apparatus have been struck. Improving the safety of personnel working on these roads is a priority of the department.

One of the measures used to reduce the risk to our members is the dispatching of a "blocking" unit whenever possible. The intent of the blocking unit is to shelter the incident scene by using a heavy piece of apparatus as a physical barrier between oncoming traffic and fire and rescue personnel.

Incident Background:

The involved section of I-495, also known as the Capital Beltway, is a ten lane highway divided in the middle by a concrete jersey wall. The "inner loop" has a full width left shoulder, five travel lanes, and a full width right shoulder. There is a four foot high concrete jersey wall on the right edge of the right shoulder. The ground level behind the wall is even with the top of the jersey wall. The posted speed limit on this section of the Beltway is 55 mph.

On the afternoon of Saturday February 14, 2015 a wet, heavy snow began falling across the Washington region. The weather service had predicted a "dusting" of snow in the area, and as such, the county's roads were not pretreated. The roads were soon covered with slush which turned to thick ice as temperatures dropped into the teens.

¹ Identified as Vehicle 3 in the Maryland State Police preliminary report (not included).

The snow and slippery road conditions significantly increased the volume of calls being received at the Emergency Communications Center (ECC), and in the early evening hours of the 14th, the ECC Supervisor declared "Condition Red". Under Condition Red, response assignments are reduced and blocking units are removed from most collision assignments unless specifically requested by a unit that is on the scene or responding. This is done to conserve apparatus for the additional calls.

By the time this incident occurred at 00:08:20² hours on Sunday February 15th, the roads were so slick with ice that personnel had trouble walking and standing. The temperature was 19 degrees Fahrenheit.

At the time of the incident, the real Ambulance 711 was out of service for mechanical reasons. Reserve Ambulance 15³, a 2002 Freightliner ambulance, was being used as Ambulance 711. The unit was staffed with four volunteer Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) from the Glen Echo Fire Department. The personnel were assigned as follows:

- A1 Driver a 23 year old female 7 years experience
- A2 Aide a 26 year old male 1 year of experience
- A3 Second EMT a 19 year old female 13 months of experience
- A4- Probationary EMT a 23 year old male 7 months experience

Incident:

At 23:40:30 hours on Saturday February 14th, Medic 726 and Engine 710 were dispatched for a personal injury collision (29-B-4) against the center jersey wall of the inner loop of I-495 between MacArthur Blvd and River Rd. No rescue squad or blocking unit was put on the call. After dispatching the incident, ECC updated the location to be between River Rd and the I-270 spur. Engine 710 got on the Beltway at River Rd and made their way through traffic to the left lanes where they could see a vehicle facing the wrong direction up against the left jersey wall. They found the occupants of this vehicle to be uninjured. From their position they could see someone in a white car on the right shoulder flagging them down. Engine 710's crew was unable to safely cross four lanes of traffic to get to the white car so they asked Medic 726 to check that vehicle while Engine 710 proceeded up I-495 to check another collision. Medic 726 acknowledged but soon arrived at the scene of the second accident. Engine 710's officer asked them about the white car and Medic 726's crew stated they missed the car. Engine 710's officer asked ECC to send another unit to check the white car, and at 23:52:24 hours Ambulance 711 was dispatched to do so.

Ambulance 711 accessed the inner loop of I-495 at River Rd and stayed in the right lanes. They came upon two vehicles, a white Toyota, and a black vehicle, parked some distance from each other on the right shoulder. Ambulance 711 arrived on the scene at 00:02:25 hours on Sunday February 15th and parked between the two vehicles. The driver of Ambulance 711 believes she was 20 to 30 feet in front of the (past) white car, and approximately one car length behind the black car. The ambulance and black car were parked completely on the right shoulder. The white car⁴ was straddling the line separating Lane 5 from the right shoulder.

⁴ Identified as Vehicle 2 in the Maryland State Police Report (not included).

⁵ Identified as Vehicle 1 in the Maryland State Police Report (not included).

The ambulance driver (A1) got out, placed a wheel chock, and then went with the A3 person to check the occupant of the black car in front of the ambulance. The A2 and A4 personnel went to the white car behind the ambulance and began assessing three patients. The A1 and A3 EMTs found that the sole occupant of the black car was uninjured and had stopped due to road conditions, not because of a collision. The black car pulled away and both EMTs went to the white car to assist. Due to the number of patients, Ambulance 711 called for two additional transport units.

Because the white car was sitting on the line separating the shoulder from a travel lane, the crew members could not safely access the driver's side of the vehicle, and they were conducting their interviews through the open doors on the passenger side. The ambulance driver (A1), realizing the danger of their position, retrieved a road flare from her unit, and placed it approximately 20 feet behind the white car near the edge of Lane 5. As she was walking back to the white car she noticed a red pickup truck sliding at a high rate of speed towards the white car.

The A4 EMT realized he had forgotten his coat and went back to the side patient compartment door of Ambulance 711 to get it. The A3 EMT was talking to the front seat passenger and driver of the white car through the open front passenger side door. The A2 EMT was standing in the open rear passenger side door interviewing the back seat passenger who was sitting behind the driver. As he was doing so, he glanced through the rear windshield and saw a pickup truck sliding towards him. He had no time to react and has no memory of the impact.

The pickup truck, a red 2005 Ford F-150⁵, had been traveling in Lane 1 at a speed that was unsafe for the icy road conditions. The driver, who stated to police that he had been drinking, lost control as he approached the scene of the original collision. His vehicle slid sideways across four lanes of traffic, narrowly missing the A1 EMT, before striking the left rear corner of the white car at 00:08:20 hours. The impact pushed the white car into the right jersey wall and then 20 to 30 feet down the shoulder into the rear of Ambulance 711, which was also pushed several feet. The A4 EMT who was standing between Ambulance 711 and the jersey wall had to run to keep from being overtaken by the sliding vehicles. The initial impact threw the A2 EMT up in the air. He landed on top of the jersey wall 10 or more feet from his original location. The A3 EMT was found lying next to the right front tire of the pickup truck 20 or more feet from her original location. Based on where she was found, she most likely was thrown into the air, landed on the hood of the pickup truck, and was carried down the road before falling off when the vehicles stopped. The vehicles came to rest with the heavily damaged white car sandwiched in between Ambulance 711, the jersey wall, and the driver's side of the F-150 pickup truck (see incident diagram at end of report).

The driver of Ambulance 711 immediately called for Advanced Life Support (ALS) assistance telling ECC that two members had been struck. She and the A4 EMT began rendering care to the injured EMTs. In

⁴ Identified as Vehicle 2 in the Maryland State Police Report (not included).

⁵ Identified as Vehicle 1 in the Maryland State Police Report (not included).

addition to the injured EMTs, the impact of the truck further injured the three occupants of the white car, and trapped them inside.

Response:

When Ambulance 711 originally called for two additional transport units, ECC dispatched Ambulance 741C with Truck 710 as a blocking unit (Engine 710 was out of position on Democracy Blvd returning from the previous incident). Moments later, after the crew from Ambulance 711 was struck, ECC added Engine 710 and Medic 741.

Truck 710 was on River Rd over the Beltway when they heard Ambulance 711's driver calling for help because two members had been struck. They were the first heavy unit to arrive and the officer directed his drivers to block Lanes 1 through 4 with the ladder truck. He made a circle check, determined the number of patients, established command, and requested an EMS Task Force⁶. His crew began rendering care to the injured. Engine 710 arrived approximately four minutes later and began assisting Truck 710's crew.

At 00:14:47 hours ECC filled out the EMS Task Force by adding Ambulance 751, Ambulance 733, Ambulance 705, Medic 723, Paramedic Engine 706, Paramedic Engine 730, and EMS701 to the incident. Battalion Chief 702 and Medic 730 had been notified by phone and were already responding. The decision by Truck 710's officer to call for the EMS Task Force so early in the event was critical to the successful outcome of the incident. It provided the subsequent incident commander all of the resources he needed to handle the incident with the notable exception of a rescue squad.

Battalion Chief 702 arrived and did a face to face interview with Truck 710's officer then assumed command of the incident. He was told that the A2 EMT was unconscious, suffering from an obvious head injury, and had Agonal respirations. Based on these injuries, Command was left with the impression that this employee would not survive the ride to the hospital. The A3 EMT was described as a Priority 1 Category A trauma patient. The conditions of the occupants of the other vehicles were still being gathered. Command directed that the injured EMTs be transported as quickly as possible.

Command made the following assignments as help arrived (by radio or through the window of the Battalion Chief 702 vehicle):

- Immediate treatment and transport of the injured EMTs Medic 741, Ambulance 741C
 - Medic 741 transported the A2 EMT
 - o Ambulance 741C transported the A3 EMT without a paramedic to expedite transport
- Extrication: Truck 710, Engine 710, and later, Rescue Squad 741 when they arrived
- EMS Medic 723, Medic 730, Ambulance 751, Ambulance 705, Ambulance 733, Paramedic Engine 730, and EMS 701
 - Medic 723 was assigned the first patient removed from white car
 - Medic 730 was assigned the second patient removed from the white car

⁶ 5 transport units, 2 Paramedic Engines, 1 additional ALS unit, 1 EMS Duty Officer, 1 Command officer.

- Ambulance 751 and the medic from Paramedic Engine 730 were assigned the third and final patient from the white car
- F-150 Four occupants Ambulance 705, Ambulance 733, Paramedic Engine 706
- Volunteer Duty Operations Chief Incident Scene Safety Officer (later relieved by Safety 700)

The responding units were slowed by the icy road conditions, and were further hampered as they approached the scene by stopped traffic, cars driving the wrong way on the shoulders of the inner loop, and cars driving the wrong way up the access ramps from River Rd. Duty Chief 700 arrived and worked with the state police to get traffic flowing on the left shoulder. This was instrumental in getting assistance to the scene. He then reported to the command post where he began the critical incident notification process and worked with the state and county police to activate their major incident investigative units.

Command directed the incoming EMS units to position past the incident in a line for quick egress. All of the EMS units were told what patients they would receive (as noted above) and what hospital they would be transporting to. The units acknowledged the assignments given to them, but there was some confusion late in the incident when the last patient from the white car ended up in Ambulance 705 instead of Ambulance 751.

In all, nine people were evaluated, and a total of six patients were transported. The injured EMTs were taken to the Trauma Unit at Suburban Hospital, a decision driven by road conditions, the location of the incident, and the direction the EMS units had to egress. The three priority two patients from the white car were transported to Med Star because Suburban could not take other trauma patients. The single priority three patient was taken to Suburban for evaluation in the Emergency Department.

After all of the patients had been transported, the scene was secured by officers from the county and state police. Truck 710 remained on the scene to provide blocking protection and lighting to police investigators. The State Highway Administration's incident support truck arrived and placed traffic cones along the Beltway prior to the incident to improve safety and traffic flow. While protecting the scene for investigators, T710 was nearly struck by a second drunk driver.

At the request of Duty Chief 700, and based on the reported condition of the A2 EMT, the Montgomery County Police "Zebra Team" was activated. The Zebra Team investigates collisions that involve, or will likely involve, a fatality on any road where the county police have jurisdiction. Since I-495 is normally under the jurisdiction of the Maryland State Police, their "Crash Team" conducted the investigation with the assistance and support of the Zebra Team.

Much of the MCFRS leadership, including the fire chief, quickly reported to Suburban Hospital. The clothing and personal belongings of the injured members were impounded by Safety 700. Family liaisons for both EMTs were identified, and notifications were made. The A1 and A4 EMTs were interviewed for the first time. The Critical Incident Stress Management Team was activated and conducted a debriefing at Suburban Hospital.

Issues Identified:

The following issues were identified and had the impacts described:

- Ice Ice covered roads significantly slowed incoming resources and made scene footing treacherous. Numerous firefighters fell and extrication was complicated by the fact that the people operating hydraulic tools could not get traction on the ice. A salt truck was requested by Truck 710's officer shortly after he arrived on the scene but no truck ever came.
- Confusion with last patient Command assigned specific patients to specific EMS units based on the order in which they were removed from the white car. The first two patients removed ended up in the appropriate units, but the last patient ended up in Ambulance 705 – not Ambulance 751. This caused some confusion but was quickly straightened out.
- The incident was not declared a Mass Casualty Incident (MCI) This does not appear to have had a significant impact on the incident, but had command declared it an MCI, then a Transportation Officer would likely have been established, and the confusion with the last patient might have been avoided.
- Radio discipline A number of responders reported that they did not hear certain commands
 that are clearly audible on the audio recordings of the incident. In several cases, those same
 firefighters acknowledged that because of the injuries sustained by our personnel, they were
 mentally distracted and weren't paying proper attention to their radios.
- DFRS Policy 812 was not implemented after the collision DFRS Policy 812 "Injury Investigation Team Procedures" requires that an Injury Investigation Team (IIT)⁷ be assembled whenever an employee sustains an injury "that requires hospitalization and/or an extensive recuperation period".
- No knowledge of Police Investigative Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) After this incident, it was discovered that there is an MOU between the county and state police collision investigative units, that gives each the authority to investigate a collision in the other's area if the collision involves one of their vehicles. In this case, the investigation could have been handled solely by the Montgomery County Zebra Team because the incident involved a county vehicle (Ambulance 711).

Recommendations:

 Assure that a blocking unit is dispatched on all incidents on interstate highways across the county regardless of Condition Red or other factors. This unit will position to provide a protected work zone.

Park the blocking unit far enough from the scene that it cannot be easily knocked into the
protected work zone but close enough to prevent drivers from being able to change lanes back
into the work zone.

⁷ The IIT consists of the DFRS Safety Officer, a DFRS Deputy Safety Officer, an EMS Duty Officer, a Fire Prevention Officer, a Bargaining Unit member, a Bureau Chief, and other members as needed.

- Personnel assigned to the blocking unit should disembark as soon as the unit is positioned and it is safe to do so, and they should move downstream into the protected area to help other crews or move off the road. Personnel should not stay on the blocking unit.
- To the extent that the needs and hazards of an incident allow, all apparatus should be parked in a manner to shelter and protect the area where fire and rescue personnel will be working. This is critical in the absence of a blocking unit.
- Consider adding a rescue squad to the EMS Task Force.
- Expand MCI training to include full scale practical sessions that reinforce not only triage, but the physical movement of patients, the set up of treatment areas, and the build out of the command structure to support the incident.
- Work with other public safety agencies, the police, and the State Highway Administration to identify best practices for protecting first responders working on interstate highways.
- Review and develop Memorandum of Understanding agreements with other agencies and jurisdictions to define the roles each will play on multi-agency incidents.
- During winter months MCFRS units should carry some form of grit, such as coarse black sand, that can be deployed to improve traction on ice. Absorbent was not effective on this incident.
- Follow DFRS Policy 812 any time a significant firefighter injury occurs regardless of member affiliation (volunteer or career). The policy was written with fire suppression injuries in mind but should be followed in any case of serious injury.

Conclusion:

On February 15, 2015, the Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Service nearly suffered multiple Line of Duty Deaths (LODD). Two volunteer members were seriously injured. They will carry the physical scars and memories from this event for the rest of their lives. The fact that they survived is due in part to the excellent work done by the crews that responded to assist. Those crews did an exemplary job of handling an MCI incident that was emotionally and environmentally challenging.


All four of the Glen Echo Fire Department EMTs remain committed to the fire service. The A1 and A4 EMTs have already returned to full duty. Their injured counterparts are making strides and will both return to full duty in the near future. The willingness of all four to return to service after suffering such a close call speaks to their courage and dedication.

At the time of this writing, the Maryland State Police are preparing their final report. The driver of the pickup truck was found at fault. His blood alcohol level was reported to be .08, but he has not been charged. When the police report has been finalized, the case will be forwarded to the State's Attorney's Office for disposition.

This incident should serve as a learning experience and as a reminder that MCFRS must continue to develop strategies for improving the safety of fire and rescue personnel working on high speed roadways.


Incident Diagrams:

Pre Collision Diagram of Incident Scene



MCFRS 2015

Incident Scene After Impact and During Operations




Incident Photographs (taken after the vehicles were separated):





The white Toyota involved in the original collision





The red Ford F150 that struck the crew of A711 and the white Toyota

Appendix A – Incident Timeline as provide by ECC (times in narrative above are taken from the voice print time stamps and do not match the times below)

23:39:07	29-B-4 sent to pending
23:40:06	M726 E710 dispatched
23:41:20	M726 en route
23:42:11	E710 en route
23:42:51	
	[7B] SECOND VOCAL
23:46:08	[E710] TRANSMISSION TO HAVE M726 CHECK THE VEHICLE PRIOR TO E710
23:47:43	E710 on scene
23:49:49	M726 on scene
23:51:06	AUDIO TRANSCRIPTION 1 (see Appendix B)
23:51:55	A711 dispatched
23:54:40	A711 en route
23:55:17	[7B] TRANSMISSION TO A711 ABOUT WHICH VEHICLE TO CHECK
23:58:29	M726 transporting to Suburban
00:01:50	E710 clear
00:02:25	A711 on scene
00:04:36	AUDIO TRANSCRIPTION 2 (see Appendix B)
00:06:39	A741C T710 dispatched
00:08:21	T710 en route
00:08:29	AUDIO TRANSCRIPTION 3 (see Appendix B)
00:08:34	A741C en route
00:09:25	M741 E710 dispatched
00:09:34	M741 en route
00:09:38	E710 en route
00:09:52	AUDIO TRANSCRIPTION 4 (see Appendix B)
00:10:00	M726 at Suburban
00:11:02	T710 on scene
00:12:23	AUDIO TRANSCRIPTION 5 (see Appendix B)
00:12:43	M730 dispatched
00:13:42	A751 A733 A705 M723 PE706 PE730 EMS701 dispatched
00:13:57	BC702 en route
00:14:05	M730 en route
00:14:44	PE730 en route
00:14:55	E710 on scene
00:15:08	PE706 en route
00:15:30	M723 en route
00:15:39	DC700 en route
00:15:49	A751 en route
00:16:22	EMS701 en route
00:16:33	A705 en route
00:16:54	VDC700 en route
00:16:58	A733 en route
00:17:02	C741E en route
00:20:45	M741 on scene
00:20:49	A741C on scene
00:21:11	BC702 on scene

00:24:30	M741 transporting to Suburban
00:24:38	M726 clear
00:24:59	M730 on scene
00:27:35	RS741 dispatched
00:28:30	PE706 on scene
00:28:55	RS741 en route
00:29:58	C741E on scene
00:30:00	A751 on scene
00:30:42	PE730 on scene
00:32:18	M741 at Suburban
00:33:22	VDC700 on scene
00:33:59	A741C transporting to Suburban
00:34:03	A741C at Suburban
00:34:05	A705 on scene
00:37:37	M723 on scene
00:39:10	A733 on scene
00:40:03	RS741 on scene
00:40:17	EMS701 on scene
00:47:07	C700 en route
00:55:08	M730 transporting to MedStar
00:55:14	SA70 on scene
01:03:17	A705 transporting to MedStar
01:05:16	A733 transporting to Suburban
01:07:06	VDC700 clear
01:08:19	RS741 clear
01:09:22	M723 transporting to MedStar
01:10:19	C741E clear
01:11:37	PE706 clear
01:13:26	E710 clear
01:14:09	A733 at Suburban
01:21:04	PE730 clear
01:21:42	A751 clear
01:27:56	M730 at MedStar
01:28:57	DC700 clear
01:32:40	A705 at MedStar
01:43:52	M723 on scene [PRESUMED AT MEDSTAR]
01:59:18	A711 clear
02:04:06	A733 clear
02:18:45	M741 clear
02:21:47	BC702 clear
02:25:23	A741C clear
02:44:26	C700 clear
02:59:05	M723 clear
02:59:36	A705 clear
02:59:42	SA700 clear
03:02:09	M730 clear
03:22:15	T710 clear
03:22:47	EMS701 clear
03:26:03	Event Closed
00.20.00	210111 010000

Appendix B - Audio Transcriptions from Appendix A as provided by ECC

AUDIO TRANSCRIPTION 1: BEGINNING AT 23:51:06

[E710] "E710 MONTGOMERY"

[7B] "E710?"

[E710] "COULD YOU SEND ANOTHER AMBULANCE TO CHECK THE WHITE VEHICLE?

AMBULANCE, UH, MEDIC, MEDIC UNIT HERE [UNCLEAR] DIDN'T SEE US. THEY

WERE FLAGGING US AS WE WERE [UNCLEAR]"

[7B] "OKAY E710"

AUDIO TRANSCRIPTION 2: BEGINNING AT 00:04:36

[A711] "A711 MONTGOMERY, WE HAVE, UH, FOUR PATIENTS REQUESTING

TRANSPORT. DO YOU HAVE A SECOND EMS UNIT?"

[7B] "OKAY A711, AND UH, JUST CONFIRM YOU'RE IN BETWEEN RIVER ROAD AND

THE 270 SPUR?"

[A711] "THAT IS CORRECT. WE ARE ON THE RIGHT SHOULDER."

[7B] "OKAY A711. TRIPLE-OH-FIVE"

[7B] "MONTGOMERY TO A711, DO YOU SEE E710?"

[A711] "A711 TO MONTGOMERY, WE ARE BEFORE E710"

[7B] "A711 YOUR MESSAGE WAS BROKEN UP"

[A711] "A711 TO MONTGOMERY, WE ARE BEFORE E710. WE HAVE NOT YET REACHED

THEM AND I CANNOT SEE THEIR CREW FROM WHERE WE ARE."

[7B] "OKAY A711"

AUDIO TRANSCRIPTION 3: BEGINNING AT 00:08:29

[A711] "A711 TO MONTGOMERY, OUR SCENE WAS JUST HIT. I HAVE MULTIPLE

MEMBERS WHO WERE JUST HIT BY A CAR THAT SLID OUT OF CONTROL. I NEED

ALS ON SCENE IMMEDIATELY."

[7B] "OK A711. MONTGOMERY TO T710, ARE YOU DIRECT ON A711'S MESSAGE?"

[T710] "WE ARE"

AUDIO TRANSCRIPTION 4: BEGINNING AT 00:09:52

[A711] "A711 TO MONTGOMERY, DO I HAVE AN ALS UNIT COMING?"

[7B] "A711 YOU'LL HAVE M741, E710, T710, A741C"

[T710] "T710 TO A711 IF YOU WOULD ADVISE WHICH LANES YOU'RE IN?"

[7B] "A711 ARE YOU ABLE TO ADVISE THE LANE?"

[A711] "A711 TO MONTGOMERY, I CAN SEE ANOTHER ENGINE COMING TOWARDS US

RIGHT NOW. I'M SORRY I DIDN'T COPY YOUR MESSAGE"

[7B] "WHICH LANE ARE YOU IN?"

[A711] "WE ARE ON THE RIGHT SHOULDER. I HAVE TWO MEMBERS WHO ARE DOWN.

UMM, NOW WE JUST NEED HELP."

[7B] "OK A711. T710 SHOULD BE PULLING UP."

AUDIO TRANSCRIPTION 5: BEGINNING AT 00:12:23

[T710] "T710 MONTGOMERY, CAN YOU ADVISE THE UNITS YOU HAVE COMING AT THIS

TIME?"

[7B] "T710 YOU HAVE A741C, M741, E710. GETTING READY TO DISPATCH A SECOND

ALS TRANSPORT."

[T710] "GO AHEAD A START ME AN EMS TASK FORCE. I HAVE, UH, MULTIPLE PATIENTS

FROM THE FIRST ORIGINAL VEHICLE, TWO ADDITIONAL PATIENTS. BOTH ALS."

[7B] "OK. ATTENTION ALL UNITS RESPONDING AND ON THE SCENE INNER LOOP I-495

BETWEEN RIVER RD AND I-270 SPUR SWITCH OPERATIONS TO 7 GOLF; 7 GOLF

FOR OPERATIONS"